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THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF NEW MEXICO DISTRICT COURTS OVER CIVIL CASES INVOLVING INDIANS

1. INTRODUCTION
The large quantity of Indian lands and Indian people in New Mexico'
increases the possibility that local attorneys will eventually litigate civil
cases involving Indians as plaintiffs or defendants. Assuming that most
non-Indian lawyers wish to avoid litigating such cases in tribal courts,
understanding the jurisdictional basis for litigating those cases in state
courts is a prime concern; it can also be a major source of confusion.
While the law of state court subject matter jurisdiction over these cases
is significantly different from the law in cases where Indians are not
parties, these differences need not deter practitioners from undertaking
such cases.
This Comment has three purposes. Through an historical analysis and
synthesis of the leading New Mexico Supreme Court cases of the last
twenty-five years, the Comment constructs a model by which lawyers
can determine whether New Mexico state courts have jurisdiction over a
particular case. The Comment also will explain the implications of the
New Mexico Supreme Court's interpretation of the model in its most
recent subject matter jurisdiction case, State ex rel. Departmentof Human
Services v. Jojola.2 Finally, the Comment will suggest an alternative
method of analysis for future cases.
II. JURISDICTION AND SOVEREIGNTY

The United States political system is based upon dual sovereignty of
state and nation. 3 Our federal system was designed to protect individual
liberty by promoting conflicts between sovereigns. 4 While originally considered unworkable by some political philosophers,' the system has sur1. The federal government recognizes 25 separate reservation tribes in New Mexico, the largest
and most populous of which is the Navajo. Because the Navajo reservation extends into Arizona
and Utah, census figures may be imprecise, but Environmental Development Association figures
indicate more than 100,000 reservation Indians inhabit over 8 million acres of tribal and federal
lands. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Federal and State Indian Reservations-An EDA Handbook 33-35, 248-300 (1971)
2. 99 N.M. 500, 660 P.2d 590, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 49 (1983).
3. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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vived and flourished. Although the continued vitality of the federal system
may be a matter for debate, the conflict between sovereigns remains a
major theme in constitutional law. 6
Sovereignty has been defined as the right of people to organize themselves into political, social, and cultural patterns, 7 and to use their land,
resources, and manpower exclusively for their own needs.' Sovereignty
depends upon the power to influence and to coerce mutually beneficial
conduct on the part of individuals. This power, in turn, depends upon
the ability of the sovereign to assume jurisdiction over individuals in
order to enforce laws and administer justice. When individuals owing
allegiance to one sovereign become involved with individuals owing
allegiance to a different sovereign, conflicts of law and jurisdiction are
inevitable.'
Jurisdictional questions concerning Indians implicate not only federal
and state sovereignty, but tribal sovereignty as well. Almost every problem
of Indian law involves a conflict between the sovereignty of the tribe and
that of a state or the federal government. ' These problems are exacerbated
by the fact that the respective spheres of authority of the federal, state,
and tribal governments have not remained static. As public policy towards
Indians varies from the drive for assimilation" to the desire for preservation,' 2 the judicial determinations of the relationship between the tribal
courts and the state or federal courts have not been consistent. "
In the early years of our republic, the federal government pursued a
doctrine of recognizing absolute tribal sovereignty. Worcester v. Georgia4
is the seminal case defining the relationship between the states and the
tribes. In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall declared that "the several
Indian nations [are] distinct political communities, having territorial
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right
to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged,
but guaranteed by the United States." 5
As the land base of the Indians lessened, however, their independence
likewise decreased. When the federal government first began to allow
states to regulate reservation land within their borders, the states could
6. Id.
7. Kickingbird, Kickingbird, Chibitty & Berkley, Indian Sovereignty, Institute for Development
of Indian Law 2 (1977).
8. Id. at 5.
9. Id.
10. See Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 206.
11. Id. at 210-11.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
15. Id. at 557.
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do so only where jurisdiction had been specifically granted to them by
the federal government. 16 Later, the presumption was changed from denying state jurisdiction to allowing state jurisdiction; in Williams v. Lee, 7
the Supreme Court said in dicta that, even on reservations, state laws
may be applied unless such application would interfere with reservation
self-government or impair a right granted or reserved by federal law.' 8
Most recently, the restriction on state regulation was almost completely
eliminated. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes,' 9 the Supreme Court
appeared to allow the application of state law, even though it would
infringe on tribal self-government or pre-empt federal law, as long as
there is sufficient state interest to justify the assertion of state authority."0
These cases illustrate a gradual erosion of tribal sovereignty. While
state courts were originally denied jurisdiction over Indian country, the
federal government has relaxed the standard over time. The first step in
the relaxation of the ban against state court jurisdiction was to allow
jurisdiction over Indian land if federally authorized; next, states were
permitted to exercise jurisdiction unless the exercise was specifically
prohibited; at present, the states are allowed to ignore the prohibition on
jursidiction if a sufficient state interest can be articulated. The mirage of
tribal sovereignty thus vanishes in the face of a sufficient state interest.
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN INDIAN LAW
To dispense binding judgments upon individuals, courts traditionally
have exercised two types of jurisdiction: subject matter jurisdiction and
in personam jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's
competence to determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong;2' personal jurisdiction refers to the power
of a court over the person of a defendant.22 Under traditional analysis,
proper forum selection would depend upon the court in question having
the competence to hear such a proceeding23 and having jurisdiction over
the defendant, effected through service of process.24 In order to bind the
defendant to the judgment, a plaintiff must allege in the complaint suf16. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976).
17. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
18. Id. at 219.
19. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
20. Id. at 157.
21. Standard Oil Co. v. Montecatini Edison S.P.A., 342 F. Supp. 125, 129-30 (D. Del. 1972).
22. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
23. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980).
24. Standard Oil, 342 F. Supp. at 129. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, service of
process is also a problem in Indian Law in New Mexico. See State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 84
N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786 (1973).
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ficient jurisdiction over both the person of the defendant and the subject
matter of the action.25
Courts of general jurisdiction, such as New Mexico state district courts,26
have subject matter jurisdiction over all transitory actions 27 and over all
local actions arising within the proper venue. 28 For example, a plaintiff
who sues in tort (a transitory action) would have no trouble establishing
subject matter jurisdiction in a court of general jurisdiction.29 In an action
to quiet title to land (a local cause of action), for instance, the plaintiff
must bring suit in the court having venue where the land is located (unless
statutorily required to do otherwise).3 Applying these principles to cases
involving Indians as parties would not appear difficult. State courts would
always have subject matter jurisdiction over transitory causes of action,
but never over local causes of action when the suit arose on reservation
land because federal reservation land is not within state court venue.
Unfortunately, subject matter jurisdiction in cases involving Indians as
parties does not follow this model. Partly as a result of policy considerations, inartful judicial draftsmanship, and common law development,
the current subject matter jurisdictional model in civil cases involving
Indians bears no resemblance to the expected analysis. This discrepancy
between the traditional analysis and the results in cases where Indians
are parties stems from the United States Supreme Court case of Williams
v. Lee.32
In Williams, the Supreme Court held that a state court did not have
inherent jurisdiction when a non-Indian sued an Indian for a debt which
arose on the reservation.33 Justice Black, for the majority, articulated the
issue for the court: "[Tihe question is whether the state action infringed
on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be governed
by them."' The Court then found: "There can be no doubt that to allow
the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority ,of
the tribal courts over reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the
right of the Indians to govern themselves."" Accordingly, the Supreme
Court held that the state court, which had held for the non-Indian plaintiff,
had to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction.36
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
N.M. Const. art. 6, § 13.
State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jojola, 99 N.M. 500, 501, 660 P.2d 590, 591 (1983).
Cf. Kalosha v. Novick, 84 N.M. 502, 505 P.2d 845 (1973).
See Heckathom v. Heckathom, 77 N.M. 369, 371, 423 P.2d 410, 412 (1967).
Moreland v. Rucker Pharmaceutical Co., 59 F.R.D. 537, 540 (D. La. 1973).
See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 104 Idaho 1, 15, 655 P.2d 895, 909 (1982).
358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
Id. at 223.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 223.
Id.
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Williams was the birth of the "infringement test." As discussed previously,37 the standard ban on states regulating reservations was no longer
completely barred, but instead was barred only if the regulation infringed
upon the right of Indians to govern themselves.38 In Organized Village
of Kake v. Egan,39 the Supreme Court interpreted Williams as expanding
the scope of state jurisdiction, by construing the jurisdiction denied in
Williams as subject matter jurisdiction, rather than territorial jurisdiction.'
This interpretation has since been widely accepted and Williams is considered the landmark subject matter jurisdiction case in Indian law."' Yet
this categorization of Williams is inconsistent with traditional civil procedure. Either Williams, or Kake in construing Williams, is analytically
incorrect. 42
Under a traditional subject matter jurisdiction analysis, Williams would
have been decided differently. Williams involved a suit for debt. 43 Debt
is a transitory action." Transitory actions can be brought in any court of
general jurisdiction. 4' The district courts of Arizona, the state where
Williams arose, are courts of general jurisdiction and, thus, would have
had subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.'
Arguably, Williams changed a traditionally transitory action in debt to
a local action whenever an Indian is a defendant. Under these cases,
everything that Indians do on their lands is outside the competency of
state courts. This precedent, for all its confusion, adequately meets the
policy of prohibiting state infringement of the rights of reservation Indians
to make their own laws and to be governed by them. By forcing all
37. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
38. State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jojola, 99 N.M. 500, 502, 660 P.2d 590, 592, cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 49 (1983).
39. 369 U.S. 60 (1970).
40. In Kake, the Thlinget Indians, a tribe without their own reservation, operated salmon traps
under permits granted by the federal government. The tribe sued to enjoin the State of Alaska from
enforcing a state statute prohibiting salmon traps. The Court held that the state could enforce the
statute, despite language of the Alaska statehood act providing that "Indian property (including
fishing rights) shall not only be disclaimed by the state as a proprietary matter but also shall be and
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United States." Id. at 67-68. The Court
held that "'absolute' federal jurisdiction is not invariably exclusive jurisdiction," id., thus casting
the dispute as a federal subject matter jurisdiction versus state subject matter jurisdiction question.
Kake, therefore, is frequently cited as the case which first interpreted Williams v. Lee as a subject
matter jurisdiction case.
41. M. Price, American Indian Legal Problems 161 (1969).
42. Because Justice Black in Williams v. Lee never stated what kind of jurisdiction the Supreme
Court was prohibiting, he could have been referring to territorial, subject-matter, or in personam
jurisdiction. Kake saw Williams as a subject matter jurisdiction case. For a different interpretation
of these cases, see Canby, supra note 10, at 214.
43. 358 U.S. at 218.
44. Howle v. Twin States Exp., 237 N.C. 667-70, 75 S.E.2d 732, 736 (1953).
45. Moreland v. Rucker Pharmacutical Co., 59 F.R.D. 537, 540 (D. La. 1968).
46. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 6; see also Kemble v. Stanford, 86 Ariz. 392, 347 P.2d 28 (1960).
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disputes which arise on reservation land and have Indian defendants into
tribal courts, Indian sovereignty is preserved.
IV. THE NEW MEXICO MODEL
In Williams, the relevant factors for the court were the race of the
defendant and the location where the cause of action arose.47 The Court
never articulated why these factors were significant, nor did it give guidance to lower courts on how to interpret other fact patterns. New Mexico
has been presented with cases involving the four possible combinations
of Williams factors" and the results of these cases can be read as consistent
with Williams." The arguments which support this interpretation are,
contrary to the assertions of critics, consistent with current protectionist
policy." In addition, an interpretation of precedent which renders all cases
consistent is preferable to an interpretation which renders cases inconsistent, because the former gives a clearer prediction of future trends.
The two factors relied on in Williams each have two alternatives and
thus lend themselves to a window graph which illustrates the analysis:
Race of Defendant

Location where
the cause of
action arose

On reservation

Off reservation

Indian

Non-Indian

Indian defendant; cause
of action arising on the
reservation
Williams v. Lee
Type 1

Non-Indian defendant;
cause of action arising
on the reservation
2

3

4

Indian defendant; cause
of action arising off the
reservation

Non-Indian defendant;
cause of action arising
off the reservation

FIGURE 1. THE STATE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION MODEL

By comparing the results in cases in which the facts fall into each possible
combination, the scope of the Williams rule can be illustrated. Moreover,
the graph serves as a guide for practitioners: by "plugging in" the relevant
facts of any given case, a lawyer can determine whether the state court
has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
47. 358 U.S. at 220.
48. With two binomial factors, location where cause of action arose (on or off the reservation)
and race of the defendant (Indian or non-Indian), four combinations are possible.
49. The author uses "consistent" to mean that the policy considerations underlying the infringement test which led to the Williams holding logically produce a predictable result in other cases with
different combinations of race and location.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 73-77.
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Type 1: Hartley v. Baca
The first fact pattern, an Indian defendant and a cause of action arising
on the reservation, mirrors the fact pattern in Williams; the New Mexico
equivalent is Hartley v. Baca.5" In Hartley, an Indian had an automobile
accident with a non-Indian. 52 The accident occurred on the reservation. 3
The non-Indian sued the Indian for tort in state court. 4 The Williams
precedent dictated that the suit be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because the defendant was an Indian and the suit arose on
the reservation. The New Mexico Supreme Court properly disposed of
the issue by dismissing the case. 5
The reasoning in Hartley was somewhat confusing. The court believed
that the "infringement" test utilized a three step inquiry. 6 The Hartley
court stated that, under Williams, a court must determine: 1) whether the
parties involved are Indian or non-Indian; 2) whether the cause of action
arose on or off the reservation; and 3) the nature of the interest to be
protected." The court in Hartley determined that the plaintiff was nonIndian and the defendant was Indian, that the cause of action arose on
the reservation, and that the nature of the interest to be protected is the
defendant's right to be heard in his tribal court. 8
The Hartley court's approach fails to conform to the clear-cut analysis
of Williams in three respects. First, under Williams, it is not whether the
partiesinvolved are Indians, but whether the defendant is an Indian which
is deemed relevant. The court in Williams expressly stated that "it is
immaterial that respondent [plaintiff in the original suit] is not an Indian." 59 Contrary to the dictum in Hartley, therefore, the race of the
plaintiff is not a factor in subject matter jurisdiction.'
Second, the Hartley court misinterpreted Williams in discussing the
policy underlying infringement. Williams held that infringement constituted state interference with "the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be governed by them."61 The court in Hartley con51. 97 N.M. 441, 640 P.2d 941 (1981).
52. Id. at 442, 640 P.2d at 942.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 444, 640 P.2d at 944.
56. Id. at 443, 640 P.2d at 943.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 358 U.S. at 223.
60. Curiously, the New Mexico Supreme Court had decided this question properly 20 years earlier
in Valdez v. Johnson, 68 N.M. 476, 362 P.2d 1004 (1961). The Valdez court held that a suit instate
court against an Indian defendant for an automobile accident which occurred on the reservation must
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In Valdez, the plaintiff was an Indian. As the
results in Hartley and Valdez were identical, yet the plaintiffs were respectively non-Indian and
Indian, the race of the plaintiff must be irrelevant, as Justice Black pointed out in Williams, 358
U.S. at 220.
61. 358 U.S. at 220.
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strued infringement to prohibit state interference with an Indian defendant's "right to be heard in his tribal court." ' 62 These are different rights
which can even conflict. For example, suppose an Indian defendant would
rather be sued in state court than Indian court. Under Williams, such a
result is acceptable, as the state court could apply Indian law and the
Indian defendant would be governed by his own law. Under Hartley,
such a result is impossible, as the defendant must be heard in his own
forum.
Third, the court in Hartley failed to recognize the relationship between
the enunciated factors. The race of the defendant and the location where
the suit arose are the only inquiries necessary. The final Hartley criterion,
"the interest to be protected," is merely a restatement of the infringement
test policy, not a new variable in the analysis. The court in Hartley implied
that a balancing of competing interests yielded the result that, in that
case, the defendant's interest in being sued in his tribal court prevailed.6 3
This is inconsistent with the mandate in Williams. Under Williams, the
right of Indians to govern themselves wins in every case; no state may
infringe upon that right.' Under the facts of Hartley and Williams, that
right can be protected only by denying state court subject matter jurisdiction. Hartley, therefore, is inconsistent with Williams in that it implies
an additional third step, a policy balancing analysis on a case-by-case
basis to determine jurisdiction. Williams merely mandates the two-step
formalistic threshold determination of subject matter jurisdiction, without
policy balancing. Hartley's added step has come back to haunt the protectionists, as it has led to a new avenue by which to expand state court
jurisdiction.65
Type 2: Paiz v. Hughes
In the second possible combination-a non-Indian defendant involved
in a suit which arose on the reservation-the non-Indian has a right to
be sued in his "home" forum. This was precisely what happened in Paiz
v. Hughes.66 In Paiz, as in Hartley, an Indian and a non-Indian collided
their vehicles while on reservation land.67 This time, however, the Indian
sued the non-Indian in state court.68 Over the defendant's protest that the
court had no subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action which
arose on the reservation, the court held that jurisdiction did exist."
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

97 N.M. at 443, 640 P.2d at 943.
Id. Note that the court gave no mention of any specific competing interest.
358 U.S. at 220. Cf. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 156 (1980).
See infra text accompanying notes 119-26.
76 N.M. 562, 417 P.2d 51 (1966).
Id. at 563-64, 417 P.2d at 52.
Id.
Id. at 566, 417 P.2d at 53.
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The holding in Paiz is consistent with both Williams and Hartley. The
non-Indian defendant in Paiz argued that a state could never assume
jurisdiction over anything that happens on a reservation, regardless of
whether Indians or non-Indians were involved. The New Mexico Supreme
Court properly rejected this argument,7" just as the Court in Kake had
read Williams as abolishing the territorial barrier to state court jurisdiction.
If, for fairness reasons, an Indian defendant should be sued in his tribal
court, it follows that a non-Indian defendant should be sued in his state
court. Moreover, a non-Indian can certainly sue another non-Indian in
state court, 7 so if the race of the plaintiff is indeed irrelevant (as stated
by Williams), then Paiz was correctly decided. 72
Paiz, however, forces one to face squarely the problem discussed previously: Is the rationale of Hartley inconsistent with Williams?73 In other
words, does the right of Indians to make their own laws and be governed
by them conflict with the right of a defendant to be heard in his tribal
court?
70. Id. at 565-66, 417 P.2d at 52.
71. This, of course, is subject to residency requirements. See Heckathom v. Heckathorn, 77
N.M. 369, 423 P.2d 410 (1967).
72. Yet Paiz has been widely criticized on both logic and policy grounds. A leading authority on
civil procedure in New Mexico argues that "Hartley v. Baca ... is logically inconsistent with...
Paiz v. Hughes" and that "Paiz... should be reconsidered by the supreme court. The court undercuts
Indian sovereignty by accepting jurisdiction whenever Indian plaintiffs proceed in state court."
Occhialino, Civil Procedure, 13 N.M.L. Rev. 251, 252 n.8 (1983).
This criticism deserves examination. First, Hartley could not be logically inconsistent with Paiz
because the factual basis of the cases are reversed. In Hartley, the defendant was an Indian and the
plaintiff was non-Indian; in Paiz, the plaintiff was an Indian and the defendant was a non-Indian.
Because the rationale of the criticism is that allowing Indian plaintiffs into state court infringes upon
tribal sovereignty, this complaint cannot apply to the facts in Hartley, where the plaintiff was not
an Indian.
Yet, if race of the plaintiff were the determining factor, the more perceptive argument is that Paiz
is inconsistent with Valdez v. Johnson, 68 N.M. 476, 362 P.2d 1004 (1961). In both Paiz and Valdez
Indian plaintiffs sued in state court for an on-reservation tort. Yet the court dismissed Valdez for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and upheld such jurisdiction in Paiz.
If we assume (as Occhialino argues) that Valdez is correct and Paiz is incorrect, we still must
decide why Valdez is right for denying an Indian plaintiff the right to sue in state court, while Paiz
is wrong for allowing it. If we read "the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be governed by them" as respecting a tribe's right to govern its members, then we can see why
individual Indians should not by-pass their tribal courts. Allowing individual Indians to pursue their
actions in state courts undercuts the tribal courts' opportunities to hear the cases and, thus, infringes
on tribal governmental authority.
If we interpret the right to apply to individual Indians as defendants, however, the distinction
becomes clear, as the defendant in Valdez was an Indian while the defendant in Paiz was a nonIndian. The unfairness of subjecting an Indian defendant to a state forum appears to be the interpretation of Williams v. Lee given by the court in Hartley v. Baca. This unfairness is not implicated
in Paiz, because the defendant was not an Indian.
The criticism of Paiz as inconsistent with Hartley thus appears to be misplaced. Both cases stand
for the notion that the infringement test in Williams v. Lee is to be construed narrowly, applying
only to Indian defendants, while not impeding Indian plaintiffs of a choice of fora.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
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Hartley's interpretation of Williams as implying concern primarily for
fairness to the Indian defendant is amply supported by policy considerations. Indian plaintiffs have many reasons to want to use state courts
when suing non-Indian defendants. The lack of tribal enforcement capability may render judgments obtained in tribal courts uncollectible off
the reservation. 74 The difficulty in getting a state tribunal to give full faith
and credit to a tribal court judgment is another problem.7 5 Finally, forcing
every Indian plaintiff into Indian court could violate the due process rights
of a non-Indian defendant; a non-Indian defendant has the same right not
to be unfairly haled into a foreign forum as does an Indian defendant.76
By allowing Indians to sue non-Indians in the state courts, non-Indian
defendants are not forced into a foreign forum.
Thus, policy considerations support reading the "right of Indians to
be governed by their own laws" to apply only to Indian defendants, while
protecting the right of Indian plaintiffs to select alternative forums in
which to enforce their rights. Viewed this way, the Indian plaintiffs in
Paiz situations can sue non-Indian defendants either in tribal court or in
state court without infringing upon tribal sovereignty, just as a New
Mexico plaintiff could sue a Colorado resident in Colorado without infringing upon New Mexico's sovereignty.77
Type 3: State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson
The third fact pattern combination consists of an Indian defendant and
a cause of action which arises off the reservation. This pattern was the
case in State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson,78 where an Indian entered into
a contract with a non-Indian while off the reservation." The non-Indian
sued for breach of contract. The supreme court held that the state court
did have subject matter jurisdiction over the case: "We believe that state
jurisdiction is proper in cases between Indians and non-Indians involving
contractual obligations incurred off the reservation. 8 oThis statement has
significance because the court is unconcerned about the race of the defendant or the plaintiff in the action. Whenever individuals interact off
the reservation (and within the forum state), the state court has subject
matter jurisdiction over the resulting suit.
74. See generally Moshier, Conflicts Between State and Tribal Law: The Application of Full Faith
and Credit Legislation to Indian Tribes, 1981 Ariz. St. L.J. 801, 818-19.
75. Id. See also Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975).
76. Canby, supra note 10, at 217-18.
77. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
78. 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786 (1983).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 632, 506 P.2d at 789.
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Type 4: Trujillo v. Prince
The final combination of factors consists of a non-Indian defendant
and a cause of action which arises off the reservation. This was the case
in Trujillo v. Prince."'In Trujillo, the supreme court held that, because
a non-Indian defendant was being sued in state court (his home forum)
by an Indian for an auto accident which occurred off the reservation, the
state court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the suit. 2
Returning to the window graph, we can now flesh out the influence of
Williams v. Lee:

Race of Defendant

Location where
thecause of
action arose

On reservation

Indian

Non-Indian

Exclusive tribal court
jurisdiction
Hartley v. Baca

Concurrent tribal and
state court jurisdiction
Paiz v. Hughes

Type

Off reservation

Concurrent state and
tribal court jurisdiction
State Securities v.
Anderson

1

2

3

4
Exclusive state court
jurisdiction
Trujillo v. Prince

FIGURE 2. THE NEW MEXICO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION MODEL
FOR CASES INVOLVING INDIANS

Expressed in rule form, the New Mexico state courts' subject matter
jurisdiction over cases involving Indians can be stated thus:
The state courts have jurisdiction over all cases in which a nonIndian, state resident is the defendant, irrespective of where the cause
of action arises, and over all cases which arise off the reservation
and within the state, irrespective of the race of the defendant. The
state courts lack jurisdiction over cases involving an Indian defendant
when the cause of action arose on reservation land.
The state court subject matter jurisdiction model can be enhanced graphically with representation of state court jurisdiction:
81. 42 N.M. 337, 78 P.2d 145 (1938).
82. Id. at 344, 78 P.2d at 152.
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Race of Defendant
Indian

Location where
thecause of
action arose

Non-Indian

On reservation

Off reservation

FIGURE 3. STATE COURT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The only time the New Mexico state courts do not have subject matter
jurisdiction over a case involving Indians is when the defendant is an
Indian and the cause of action arose on the reservation, as in Hartley v.
Baca and Williams v. Lee. The mandate in Williams, that state courts
should not "infringe upon the rights of tribes to make their own laws
and be governed by them," 8 3 vests the tribal courts with at least equal
jurisdiction over cases involving their members. Thus, cases involving
Indians as defendants would always be subject to the jurisdiction of tribal
courts. All cases which arise on the reservation are similarly within tribal
court competence. Expressed graphically:

Race of Defendant
Indian

Location where
the cause of
action arose

Non-Indian

On reservation

Off reservation

FIGURE 4. TRIBAL COURT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

When the graphs are combined, the jurisdictional parameters appear
quite simple:
83. 358 U.S. at 220.
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Race of Defendant
Indian

Location where
the cause of
action arose

Non-Indian

On reservation

Off reservation

Tribal court jurisdiction
*State court jurisdiction
Concurrent jurisdiction
FIGURE 5. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN NEW MEXICO CIVIL CASES
INVOLVING INDIANS AS PARTIES

V. CRITICISM OF THE NEW MEXICO RULE

Commentators have failed to endorse the unconventional New Mexico
approach. The New Mexico rule has been criticized on the basis that its
rigidity leads to arbitrary results.' Under the facts in Hartley and Paiz
(an automobile accident between an Indian and a non-Indian which occurred on the reservation),
[T]he appropriate court to hear the resulting civil case would be
determined by which party sued first. If the Indian sues first, the
case would be sent to state court; if the non-Indian sues first, the
case would be heard solely in tribal court. This illustrates the erratic
allocation of civil jurisdiction between tribe and state prevailing in
those states where the Indian tribe remains a jurisdiction unto itself.85
By comparison, if a Colorado resident is involved in an automobile
accident with a New Mexico resident while both are in New Mexico, the
New Mexico resident could sue the Colorado resident in either New
Mexico or Colorado;86 the Colorado resident, however, could only sue
the New Mexico resident in New Mexico.87 This situation is identical to
the current state of Indian law and has never been criticized for being
erratic or arbitrary.88 Instead, this process provides a clear, logical method
84. Canby, supra note 10, at 223.
85. Id. at 206.
86. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-16 (1978).
87. See Tarango v. Pastrana, 94 N.M. 727, 616 P.2d 440 (1980).
88. In fact, such a situation is justified for just the opposite reason, that it allows fairness and
substantial justice. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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of forum selection by accurately defining the boundaries of state and tribal
jurisdiction.
The most compelling criticism of the model is that it decides subject
matter jurisdiction under principles traditionally categorized as personal
jurisdiction concerns. This criticism is accurate, although better directed
at Williams, to which New Mexico courts have merely maintained fidelity.
The court in Hartley adulterated the subject matter jurisdiction analysis
when it stated that "the interest to be protected is the defendant's right
to be heard in his tribal court." 89 This is a classic personal jurisdiction
consideration, but has no place in a subject matter jurisdiction analysis.
If the concern is the unfairness to the defendant of being haled into a
foreign forum, then the concern is independent of that forum's competency to hear cases. State Securities also is consistent with the traditional
personal jurisdiction analysis of Hartley and Paiz. Once an Indian transacts or does business in a foreign forum, he would have a reasonable
expectation of being haled into that forum and, thus, it would not violate
principles of due process or fundamental fairness to bring him within the
court's jurisdiction.' The State Securities court relied upon the rationale
of a domestic relations case with a similar fact pattern, Natewa v. Natewa,9 which argued: "Appellant cannot interpose his special status as
an Indian as a shield to protect him from obligations that result from his
marriage to appellee which has been entered into off the reservation."92
On the functional level, the infringement test is theoretically simple,
but it became quite difficult to apply in practice. Determining the race
of the defendant is rarely a problem, but determining where a cause of
action arises is often very difficult.93 The automobile accident cases discussed previously provided few problems, but in cases of libel, divorce,
94
or paternity, where the cause of action arises is much less clear. The
problem is compounded if the Indian defendant has committed several
acts, some while on the reservation and some while off the reservation,
which relate to a continuing cause of action.
VI. A RECENT APPLICATION OF THE NEW MEXICO MODEL:
STATE EX REL. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES V.JOJOLA
In State ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Jojola95 the New
Mexico Supreme Court was faced with one of the difficult unanswered
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

97 N.M. at 443, 640 P.2d at 943.
See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
84 N.M. 69, 499 P.2d 691 (1972).
Id. at 71, 499 P.2d at 693.
Canby, supra note 10, at 225 n.140.
See, e.g., Natewa v. Natewa, 84 N.M. 69, 499 P.2d 691 (1972).
99 N.M. 500, 660 P.2d 590, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 49 (1983).
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issues in subject matter jurisdiction: Where the cause of action arises in
a paternity case. 96 In Jojola, an Indian woman applied to the state for
aid for her dependent child.97 Pursuant to state and federal law, she named
Jojola, also an Indian, as the father of the child. 98 The Department of
Human Services (DHS) paid welfare payments to the mother, then sued
Jojola in state court for reimbursement. 9 The district court dismissed the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."
Under the New Mexico State Court Subject Matter Jurisdiction Model,
the two relevant factors are the race of the defendant and the location
where the cause of action arose. Because the defendant in the case, Jojola,
was an Indian, the dispositive issue in the case was where the cause of
action arose. If it were determined that the cause of action arose on the
reservation, Jojola would be classified as a Type 1 case,"0 ' like Hartley
and Williams, and the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction would be affirmed. If the court determined that the cause of
action arose off the reservation, however, the case would be a Type 3
case 10 2 and would fall under the rationale of State Securities. In that
situation, the state courts would have subject matter jurisdiction and the
district court's dismissal would be reversed.
The court in Jojola determined that the cause of action arose off the
reservation" 3 and, accordingly, that the state court had subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. " The supreme court thus reversed the dismissal
96. Id. at 503, 660 P.2d at 593. The court in Jojola actually quoted a separate initial inquiry,
whether there are any applicable federal statutes, and found none. Only after conducting this inquiry
did the court conduct an "infringement" analysis. The first question is known as the "preemption"
analysis, based on the notion that if the federal government has legislated procedural law of a case
involving Indians, it has "preempted" state court subject matter jurisdiction as a result of federal
law supremacy. See Tiffany Constr. Co. v. State, 96 N.M. 296, 629 P.2d 1225 (1984).
Respondent did not advance a preemption argument, although the chief justice in the case dissented
on that very ground, determining that the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1978)
preempted state court jurisdiction. It appears that this conclusion is erroneous, as the act provides
that the term "parent," as used in the Act, "does not include the unwed father where paternity has
not been acknowledged or established." Id. § 1903(a).
As a logical matter, the Indian Child Welfare Act is concerned with custody of Indian children;
a determination of the child's status as an Indian would be a prerequisite to determine whether the
Act applies. In re Jurious M., 144 Cal. App. 3d 785, 193 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1983). Thus, the paternity
action must precede the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act, and accordingly, could not be
"preempted" by it.
97. 99 N.M. at 501, 660 P.2d at 591.
98. Id. N.M. Stat. Ann. §40-5-7 (1978) provides in part: "The proceeding to compel support
and establish parentage may be brought by a parent or if the child is or is likely to be a public
charge, by the state of New Mexico."
99. 99 N.M. at 501,660 P.2d at 591.
100. Id.
101. See supra Fig. 5.
102. Id.
103. State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jojola, 99 N.M. 500, 503, 660 P.2d 590, 593, cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 49 (1983).
104. Id.
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and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. This
result appears consistent with previous precedent and illustrates the continued validity of the New Mexico approach.
Looking more deeply into the reasoning of the case, however, an
entirely different interpretation emerges. The court went to considerable
lengths to achieve the desired result. In order to determine that the cause
of action arose off the reservation, the court in Jojola ignored both logic
and settled principles of law. If the courts misconstrue the facts of a case
before plugging those facts into a mechanical model, the model itself
becomes useless. The court's fact finding in Jojola frustrates the purposes
of the model. The Jojola opinion illustrates all of the problems previously
discussed: confusion over the principles of subject matter and personal
jurisdiction; confusion over the interpretation of Williams and Hartley;
and misconstrual of the facts to be plugged into the subject matter jurisdiction model.
The opinion begins with a discussion of personal jurisdiction, although
the appeal was based upon subject matter jurisdiction. The court explains
personal jurisdiction by discussing subject matter jurisdiction considerations:
[W]hen a cause of action is transitory, any court of competent jurisdiction, where jurisdiction is obtained over the defendant, may entertain the cause of action regardless of where the parties were at the
time of the cause of action or where the cause of action arose."
The court's confusion over subject matter and personal jurisdiction is the
least of the problems in the opinion; however, the court's use of the above
quote is peculiar, considering that it does not apply in Indian law cases
after Hartley. The place where the cause of action arises does indeed
matter; in fact, it is dispositive of jurisdiction when the defendant is an
Indian, as in the Jojola case.
After stating traditional subject matter jurisdiction principles when discussing personal jurisdiction, the court ignored those principles when
discussing subject matter jurisdiction, instead beginning its analysis with
the classic infringement analysis of Williams v. Lee:

[Tihe question has always been whether the state action infringed
on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
governed by them.' 7
The conflicting interpretations of this passage have also been discussed
previously.' 08 Does the statement refer to tribal power over its members
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 502, 660 P.2d at 592.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
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both as plaintiffs and defendants, or only to the fairness to Indian defendants? Jojola actually presented this question to the supreme court,
but a misinterpretation of subrogation principles precluded discussion and
possible resolution of the problem illustrated by Valdez and Paiz.
The court's misconstruction of subrogation is amazingly clear:
[Wlhen [the Indian plaintiff] applied for public assistance for her
minor child . . . she assigned her right [to sue] to DHS . . . DHS
is now subrogated to [plaintiff's] position and DHS has the right to
collect the support obligation directly from the father. Therefore, the
cause of action is between DHS, a non-Indian, and Jojola, the putative father, an Indian. 9
A party who is subrogated to another can sue in its own name."' The
subrogatee, however, has exactly the same rights as the subrogator."'
The case for jurisdictional purposes, therefore, should be treated exactly
as if the Indian were still the plaintiff, as in Valdez and Paiz.
Because of the misconstruction of subrogation principles, the court did
not classify the case as one with an Indian plaintiff, as in Valdez and
Paiz, but rather as one with a non-Indian plaintiff and an Indian defendant,
as in Hartley and State Securities. As discussed previously," 2 the rights
of Indian defendants are the only rights implicated in those cases, and
the differing results in those cases hinged upon where the cause of action
arose. The court therefore missed an opportunity to settle the Paiz-Valdez
controversy.
The court continued to misconstrue the concept of subrogation. Without
explanation or authority, the court stated: "[T]he cause of action arose
outside of the reservation when Abeita filed and obtained public assistance
and assigned her support rights to DHS." '" The court apparently determined that the right of DHS to sue could not have arisen until the Indian
plaintiff transferred her right to sue by applying for public assistance.
This is erroneous. Because DHS stood in the shoes of the Indian plaintiff,
the right of DHS to sue arose at the same time that the original plaintiff's
right to sue arose. The original plaintiff's right to sue for paternity and
child support arose when she became pregnant, not when she applied for
public assistance.
Once it is determined when the cause of action arises, as a matter of
logic, the location of the parties at that time determines where the cause
of action arises. In a paternity action, the cause of action arises at con109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.

99 N.M. at 503, 660 P.2d at 593.
Martinez v. Martinez, 98 N.M. 535, 538, 650 P.2d 819, 822 (1982).
Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. Welch, 78 N.M. 494, 433 P.2d 79 (1967).
See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
99 N.M. at 503, 660 P.2d at 593.
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ception," 4 and generally, both parties will be in the same location. Accordingly, in order for an Indian or a non-Indian to sue an Indian in state
court for paternity, the act of conception must have occurred off the
reservation." 5 The district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction was correct because the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction," 6 and DHS's complaint did not contain
an allegation that conception occurred off the reservation. 1 7 The supreme
court's reversal of the district court was erroneous. More importantly,
this decision could be disastrous for protectionists. By allowing the transfer of a suit by subrogation while the plaintiff is off of the reservation to
change a cause of action which in reality arose on the reservation, the
Jojola decision creates a loophole by which state courts can expand their
jurisdiction over cases traditionally under the exclusive jurisdiction of
Indian courts. "8
The Jojolaopinion ended with a policy balancing analysis, a significant
departure from the usual formalistic analysis. The court relied on Chino
v. Chino"9 for this reasoning, as did Hartley. In Hartley, however, the
court stated, without further analysis, that "the interest to be protected
is the defendant's right to be heard in his tribal court."' 2 ° No doubt the
114. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-5-8 (1978) provides: "The proceeding [for paternity] may be instituted
during the pregnancy of the mother or after the birth of the child, but except with the consent of
the person charged with being the father, the trial shall not be had until after the birth of the child."
115. See Martin v. Juvenile Court, 172 Colo. 261, 463 P.2d 1093 (1972), and Francisco v. State,
113 Ariz. 427, 556 P.2d 1 (1976). In both cases, the state court had subject matter jurisdiction only
because conception occurred off the reservation. Martin and Francisco represent opposite fact patterns
to Jojola: the courts held that they had subject matter jurisdiction because conception occurred off
the reservation, but then held that they had no personal jurisdiction over the defendant because
service of process was effected on the reservation. Francisco, 113 Ariz. 427, 556 P.2d 1;Martin,
172 Colo. 261, 463 P.2d 1093. While the Martin and Franciscoopinions are explicit and on point,
the problems raised by their precedents are considerable. The time of conception in some cases
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove; for example, if intercourse happened in
different locations during the period in question, the findings in such cases could become completely
arbitrary.
116. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
117. State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jojola, 99 N.M. 500, 660 P.2d 590, cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 49 (1983); Plaintiff's Complaint at 1.
118. An example of the ramifications of the court's reasoning can be illustrated by re-examining
Williams v. Lee. In Williams, the defendant bought goods from the plaintiff on the reservation but
defaulted on payment. The plaintiff sued the defendant in state court. Williams held that the state
court had no jurisdiction because the defendant was a reservation Indian and because the cause of
action arose on the reservation. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
Under the Jojola rationale, however, if the plaintiff assigned the delinquent account to a collection
agency, the collection agency's cause of action could "arise" off the reservation, and the state court
could assert jurisdiction. Jojola gives states the opportunity to sidestep the subject matter jurisdiction
model by changing the location where the cause of action arises from on the reservation to off the
reservation. This infringes upon the tribal courts' exclusive jurisdiction and, accordingly, the right
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be bound by them. Such a result conflicts with
the anti-infringment policy of Williams and should be overruled.
119. 90 N.M. 203, 561 P.2d 476 (1977).
120. 97 N.M. at 443, 640 P.2d at 943.
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defendant in Jojola could have made the exact same claim, relying on
Hartley. Instead, counsel for the defendant relied, quite reasonably, on
Williams' categorization of the interest as "the right of reservation Indians
to make their own laws and be bound by them."' 2 Amazingly, the court
found that this interest was outweighed by the state's interest in having
a convenient forum in which to litigate paternity actions against Indian
defendants: "[T]o require the State of New Mexico to proceed to the
various tribal courts of the State would defeat and be a burden on the
aims of the public assistance program. . . . Therefore, the interest to be
protected is the uniform enforcement of paternity determination and child
support obligations within the State."' 22
This argument implies that a sufficient state interest will overcome
tribal sovereignty and that the Williams "infringement" test has been
overruled by the significant state interest test of Washington v. Confederated Tribes. 23
' Jojola can thus be read to overrule the formalistic subject
matter jurisdiction model. The court, however, concludes its policy statement with the assertion that it found "no interference with tribal self
government as long as DHS does not assert jurisdiction within the reservation." 12
This conclusion is based on the Williams test, which is a threshold test
for determining infringement. The rest of the argument, however, assumes
that such infringement has occurred, and allows it. If, as the court determined by the model analysis, there was no infringement, the significance of the state interest would be irrelevant. Nevertheless, the court in
Jojolafound both the absence of infringement and a sufficient state interest
to justify infringement.
The result in Jojola leaves a major question unanswered. If the subject
matter jurisdiction model determines infringement, yet the policy balancing analysis yields a sufficient state interest, will the court adhere to
Williams v. Lee and dismiss, or follow Washington v. ConfederatedTribes
and allow the suit? Judging by the lengths to which the court went to
find jurisdiction in Jojola, the Williams test may well be discarded in
New Mexico.
Jojola remains the law in New Mexico; DHS can sue Indian defendants
in state court for paternity and for failure to pay child support. DHS has
declined to accept this invitation, however, and as a result of administrative policy, dropped the suit and has filed all similar suits exclusively
in tribal courts.' 2 5 In light of this action, the United States Supreme Court
121. 99 N.M. at 502, 660 P.2d at 592.
122. Id. at 503, 660 P.2d at 593.
123. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). See supra text accompanying footnotes 19-20.
124. 99 N.M. at 503, 660 P.2d at 593.
125. For a description of the policy, see 3 Dept. of Human Services, Income Support Division
Program Manual § 529 (1983).
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denied certiorari on the case. 126 As a result, the decision stands as an
example of the lengths a court will undertake to circumvent the protection
from infringement guaranteed by Williams v. Lee. Moreover, if the DHS
administrative policy changes, the Jojola precedent would allow DHS to
pursue paternity suits in state court in all cases.
The problems that occur as a result of using personal jurisdiction factors
to determine subject matter jurisdiction are more fundamental than mere
mislabeling. As Jojola indicates, the erosion of tribal sovereignty continues as a result of the imprecise language of the analysis. By categorizing
subject matter jurisdiction as an interest balancing between tribe and state,
the opportunity for expansion of state jurisdiction at the expense of tribal
sovereignty is preserved.
One possible solution to this problem is to admit that state courts are
courts of general subject matter jurisdiction and that they accordingly
have subject matter jurisdiction over all cases, irrespective of the race of
the parties to the suit.'27 The court could then inquire into the nature of
the Indian defendant's contacts with the state-whether such contacts
were sufficient to justify haling the Indian defendant into state court and
would accord with notions of fair play and substantial justice. 2 ' The
United States Supreme Court approved this practice in Fischer v. District
Court.2' 9
Critics may point out that such an approach could sound the death
knell for tribal sovereignty, because all that would be required to obtain
state court personal jurisdiction over an Indian defendant would be inhand, in-state service of process,' 3 ° or long-arm jurisdiction."'3 One possible answer to this criticism is that, for Indian defendants at least, minimum contacts analysis should replace traditional modes of acquiring in
personam jurisdiction.' Under such a rule, an Indian defendant would
not be subject to in personam jurisdiction merely by service of process
but would also have to have had minimum contacts with the state off the
reservation.' 3 3 Such an approach has several advantages. First, it elimi126. 104 S. Ct. 49 (1983).
127. This rule would be subject to restrictions authorizing exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as
bankruptcy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1984). As applied to the facts in Jojola, note that the court could
have concluded that district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over paternity cases. See In re
Adoption of Arnall, 94 N.M. 306, 610 P.2d 193 (1980).
128. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
129. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
130. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877). See also Jojola, 99 N.M. at 502, 660 P.2d
at 592.
131. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-16 (1978).
132. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); cf. Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 22, 246
S.E.2d 732 (1981).
133. Canby, supra note 10, at 226. For whether "minimum contacts" or strict construction of
the long ann statute is the law in New Mexico, compare United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic
Corp., 96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980), with Worland v. Worland, 89 N.M. 291, 551 P.2d 981
(1978).
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nates confusion about the nature of state court subject matter jurisdiction
over cases involving Indians by using principles consistent with general
civil procedure. Second, it protects both the individual defendant and the
tribe by precluding state jurisdiction unless the defendant has availed
himself of the benefits of off-reservation life. Third, the rule is not a
radical departure from the type of analysis attempted in Williams v. Lee
and its progeny, thus leaving intact most of the current common law.
Finally, the switch from the traditional Pennoyer v. Neff notions of state
power 34 to the due process of InternationalShoe"a5 has been long overdue,
and the Indian law arena presents the best policy arguments for its realization. If the special need to preserve tribal sovereignty can justify
convoluted and illogical subject matter jurisdiction principles, it can certainly underlie a more logical, reasonable, and precise personal jurisdiction analysis. 136
VII. CONCLUSION
As a result of Williams v. Lee, subject matter jurisdiction in Indian law
is actually a personal jurisdiction analysis. New Mexico has consistently
interpreted Williams literally, precluding state court subject matter jurisdiction over suits involving Indian defendants if the suit arose on the
reservation.
Hartley, Paiz, Trujillo, and State Securities reveal that New Mexico
courts have jurisdiction over all cases in which a non-Indian state resident
is the defendant. The courts also have jurisdiction over all cases in which
the cause of action arises off the reservation and within the state. The
state courts lack jurisdiction over cases in which the defendant is an
Indian and the cause of action arose on reservation land. This rule, while
unconventional, is consistent with the Supreme Court decision in Williams
v. Lee.
The lesson for practitioners who represent Indians in state court is
simple: counsel for a plaintiff must allege a sufficient subject matter
jurisdictional basis. If the defendant in the case is an Indian, the attorney
must show that the cause of action arose off the reservation or that there
is a sufficient state interest in providing a forum. Defense lawyers should
argue for strict adherence to Williams principles, precluding a balancing
134. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
135. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
136. The question of establishing minimum contacts with the state may not satisfactorily dispose
of the Jojola case. An act of conceiving a child on the reservation appears not to support a reasonable
belief that the defendant could be expected to be haled into the state forum. Tribes generally strongly
assert their interest in regulating their ethical and social institutions, thus supporting an interpretation
that tribal court should be the exclusive forum. In contrast, a dependent reservation child will often
require state aid, thus the state would seem to be affected even if conception occurs on the reservation.
For a discussion of an act of conception as basis of "minimum contacts," see generally Barker
v. Barker, 94 N.M. 162, 608 P.2d 138 (1980).
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of tribal and state interests. In the alternative, defense counsel may assert
that the state interest is always-or in the case at bar at least-outweighed
by concerns for tribal sovereignty.
Recently, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court has shown exceptional creativity in determining where a cause of action arises. Unrestrained by logic or precedent, the court in the most recent case, State
ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Jojola, created a loophole by
which state courts can significantly expand their jurisdiction. The New
Mexico Supreme Court also demonstrated a willingness to engage in
balancing of state and tribal interests while still professing to decide
jurisdiction questions by the formalist analysis. Both of these techniques
mark a decline from the strict adherence to the principles of Williams
and the continuation of the erosion of tribal sovereignty which began
after Worcester v. Georgia.
A new analytical scheme which would admit state court subject matter
jurisdiction over civil cases involving Indians as parties and which would
analyze such cases based upon personal jurisdiction principles of minimum contacts and due process would eliminate the confusion inherent in
the current subject matter jurisdiction analysis. It would, moreover, better
protect both Indian defendants and tribal sovereignty.
ROBERT J. WAGONER

